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Recent management studies report that demographic and cognitive characteristics of 
board of directors and corporate performance are related. [7] reported that 
demographic characteristics of managers influence positively on their voluntary 
disclosure styles. This study conjectures that demographic diversity (e.g. gender and 
age) and cognitive diversity (e.g. interlocking directorship and levels of education) of 
board of directors impacts on client’s incentive and ability to demand high audit quality 
proxy by Big4 auditors. Utilizing data from a sample of 415 firm-year observations for 
the period of 2011 to 2015 of Turkey quoted firms and using random effect estimation 
model to estimate the regression, we find a positive relationship between director 
within 36-55 and 46-55 years old and audit quality. The study’s findings also show that 
interlocking directorship and boards with Master degree holders has a significant 
positive impact on clients’ demand for high audit quality. This study contributes to 
provide additional theoretical insight by examining interlocking directorship with audit 
quality, which to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, have not been addressed in 
the environment of Turkey. 
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In recent times, regulators and practitioners concern have increased about the integrity of 
financial reporting quality, particularly after financial and accounting scandals like WorldCom, Enron 
and One_Tel [14]. For developed countries especially Turkey, the weakness of institutional setting, 
accounting standards and corporate governance have been realized as one of the reasons behind 
such financial scandals [6]. Consequently, this undermines public confidence on accounting 
profession. Given that board demographic (e.g. gender, age) and cognitive characteristics (e.g. 
interlocking directorship and level of education) is an indicator of corporate governance and the 
selection of external auditor by the board of directors as an external monitoring mechanism. It is 
therefore, important to investigate the relationship between board structure and clients demand for 
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high audit quality, because of corporate governance influence on auditor choice that in turn effect 
on the quality of audit service. This paper examines the influence of board demographic and cognitive 
characteristics on the clients’ demand for high audit quality. The concentration at the initial level on 
top management team (TMT) leads to corporate failure and financial scandals [18]. Board of directors 
is considered as the main reason behind the stock market and financial collapses [3]. Thus, board 
team diversity attracts considerable attention to enhance board monitoring role in stock markets 
categorized with lack of strong external monitoring [16]. In the past decade, it is very clear to the 
world that Turkish listed firms have been making progress in terms of transparency, corporate 
governance, and financial reporting quality. Thus, this study aims to investigate how these 
improvements are associated to the demographic and cognitive diversity of board of directors. 
Management theories long time ago proposed that board diversity attitudes play a significant 
role in organizations success, whereas different attitudes of the board of directors is a recent 
phenomenon in accounting studies. In particular, upper echelons theory suggestions that 
demographic attributes of the top management are strongly related to organization outcome [26]. 
In addition, recourse dependency theory by [36] proposes that human capital is an essential 
intangible asset for operation and decision making of corporations. Extending the suggestion of 
upper echelons theory and resource dependency theory, [5] provide evidence that demographic and 
cognitive attitudes (e.g. age, gender, interlocking directorship and level of education) and corporate 
performance of Turkey firms are related. Board demographic and cognitive diversity possess an 
essential role on clients’ selection of external auditor and the process of financial reporting, according 
to these studies in accounting and management literature. This paper conjecture that the 
demographic and cognitive characteristics possess a significant role on auditor selection. Another 
motivation came from the general agreement between policy makers and regulators on the 
significant role of board diversity at company-level. For instance, Australia and UK Stock Exchange 
markets recommends listed firms to recruit directors with different attributes such as female 
directors, educational level, age, etc. (FRC, 2010; FRC, 2012). This study’s main concern is on board 
diversity and its role to improve board monitoring effectiveness that in turn enhance financial 
reporting quality and minimize information asymmetry. Best of available literature and this study 
concern only two studies by [4] who examined gender and generation diversity in Turkey in the area 
of firm performance. On the other hand, this study examines interlocking directorship as another 
attitude of board cognitive diversity on clients’ demand for high audit quality in Turkey. The 
significant of the top management’s role in organizational outcome have been documented by 
management theories. The result of this study contributes to the accounting literature through 
connecting resource dependency theory to auditor selection. In particular, this study investigates 
how demographic and cognitive diversity of board of directors affects accounting outcome and 
particularly auditor selection. 
 
2. Theoretical background of the study   
 
Corporate board shapes firms culture with their management values, which influence on their 
implementation of accounting and financial policies. Previous management literature and population 
ecology proposes that corporation outcomes (for instance firm performance), are strongly related to 
environmental selection and bureaucratic rules [23,27]. Thus, [24,26] evolve upper echelons theory 
and they propose a unique perception and suggested that board of directors make a difference. 
Review of previous literature addressed upper echelons theory indicates that the most common 
management demographic attitudes that possess a crucial impact on corporate outcome are gender 
[9,20,30], Tenure and age [8,25]. While from the perspective of resource dependency theory, the 
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human resource is an essential intangible asset for corporate operations [36]. Upper echelons theory 
and resource dependency proposed that human capital represent crucial elements to enhance 
corporate performance. Accordingly, [13] finds that directors attitudes for instance title and 
education; are significant factors of the social capital of the upper echelons that possess a positive 
influence on firms’ performance. Furthermore, a study by [5] display that board demographic 
diversity for instance gender, age, education and nationality have a significant influence on 
performance of Turkish firms. In terms of external auditor’s role, auditor might serve as an external 
representative to conduct the corporate governance task [19]. Previous studies obviously 
documented the influence of audit quality and auditor selection on corporations [1]. The accounting 
and audit literature proposes that there is a strong relationship between audit quality and corporate 
governance mechanisms [31]. Among the interpretations regarding the demand for high quality 
audit, a relevant interpretation is that external auditor might mitigate Type II Agency problem that 
exacerbate between majority shareholders and minority shareholders. According on this proposition, 
high quality audit could provide confidential environment to attract investors. To sum up, previous 
studies provide a clear foundation to propose the passable influence of demographic, cognitive and 
of board of directors on audit quality. 
 
3. Hypotheses development  
 
This part addresses the hypothesis development of this study. It is clear from the theoretical 
background that board demographic (age & gender) and cognitive (interlocking directorship and level 
of education) play a crucial role in enhancing client incentive and ability to demand high audit quality. 
This might improve monitoring management actions and align the interest between majority 
shareholders and minority shareholders. 
 
3.1. Female director 
 
Management studies reports that gender and age of board of directors are associated with their 
tendency to accept changes and risk. Based on resource dependency theory, auditor selection 
depends on the various attitudes of board of directors. Female directors improve the efficiency of 
board monitoring functions. Therefore, they have strong tendency to hire high quality auditor to 
protect their reputation. This is because audit firms with brand name for instance Big-4 audit firms’ 
possess a strong capability to provide high quality audit services. Consequently, high quality auditor 
improves internal control system that in turn reduce information asymmetric and this influence 
positively on the reliability of accounting information [40]. The same argument is provided by 
[1,10,33] that there is a positive relationship between female director and audit quality. Furthermore, 
older directors are more conservative and risk-averse than younger directors [8,12]. This study uses 
gender and age as demographic characteristics in the study model and proposes that female and 
older director should be more conservative than male and younger directors. Based on accounting 
literature, conservatism and prudent behavior possess equal influence in auditing process that leads 
to safer audit opinion and outcome for audit firms. This means that older directors with high 
experience should be more conservative, consequently they select Big-4 auditor. Thus, it is suggested 
that board demographic diversity is positively related with audit quality.  On the basis of this, this 
study formulates the following hypothesis: 
H1a: There is a positive relationship between female directors and audit quality. 
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3.2. Directors’ age 
 
Management literature proposes that directors’ age is correlated with the tendency to accept 
risk and new changes. [12] argue that older directors compared to younger directors are more 
conservative and risk averse and they manage the firms better. This study control for directors’ age 
and propose that older directors possess more experience and they are more conservative than less 
experience and younger directors. In the area of accounting and particularly audit, conservatism 
equal to prudent behavior of auditor. Consequently, this leads to safer opinion and audit outcome. 
Therefore, it is logic to propose that older director and more experience director should be more 
prudent. This in turn enhance director’s tendency to demand high quality audit by selecting strong 
external auditor. Therefore, it is proposed that board demographic diversity proxy by directors’ age 
is positively related with audit quality.  Therefore, this work suggests the following hypothesis: 
H1b: There is a positive relationship between director age and audit quality. 
 
3.3. Interlocking directorship  
 
Based on resource dependency theory assumption interlocking directorship generates a strong 
link for corporation with the external environment. Consequently, this improve corporate 
competency to overcome environmental contingences [36,41,42]. Board of directors who occupy 
more than one directorship have a concrete motivation to involve with Big4 auditor, in order to 
protect their reputation. Previous studies by [21,29,37,43] documented a positive relationship 
between interlocking directorship and auditor selection. This is because directors involve with more 
than one directorship are less likely to spend enough time to monitor management activities.  As a 
result, they are more likely to hire high quality auditor in order to maintain their reputation.  On the 
other side, some studies by [15,17,38] reports that interlocking directorship possess negative 
influence on clients’ demand for high audit quality. This indicates that interlock directorship improve 
the relationship between the audited and auditor. Therefore, interlock organizations are more likely 
to hire the same auditor for longer time. Thus, this study proposes that cognitive diversity proxy by 
interlocking directorship is related to audit quality and it propose the following hypothesis: 
H2a: There is a relationship between interlocking directorship and audit quality. 
 
3.4. Level of education  
 
In addition, based on resource dependency theory perceptions that directors with accounting 
and financial qualification possess a strong tendency to engage with Big4 auditor to properly enhance 
board monitoring function [28]. This is supported by [2] that level of education of board of directors’ 
influence positively to improve clients’ ability to demand high audit quality. Board of directors with 
high accounting and financial qualification has a capability to understand financial reporting issues. 
Thus, they are looking for further confirmation by involving with high quality auditor. Previous studies 
report that there is a positive relationship between directors’ level of education and audit quality 
[4,35]. On the other hand, some studies documented a negative relationship between level of 
education and clients demand for high audit quality [13]. This is because educated directors are less 
conservative in making strategic decisions and they possess more tendencies to engage with high 
management manipulation. Based on inconsistency of previous studies, the study hypothesis is: 
H2a: There is a relationship between board level of education and audit quality. 
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4. Methodology  
 
This study utilized secondary data of the published financial reports of selected listed Turkish 
firms. The population of the study comprises of public firms listed on the Borsa Istanbul (BI) as 
obtained from the BI website. More specifically, public disclosure platform as at 31 December 2016 
and 83 firms are drawn as a sample based on the availability of data. Meanwhile, financial firms listed 
under the financial sector are excluded due to the variances in regulatory environment and reporting 
features. The period covered by this study is 2011 to 2015. The main reason behind the selection of 
this period for this study is to take into consideration the new Turkish commercial code that has been 
issued, effective from July 1st, 2012. In order to estimate the regression, the study used random effect 
model and this is after pooled ordinary least square (OLS) failed to meet required standard. 
 
5. Variable definition and measurement 
5.1. Model specification and variables definition 
 
To address the research objective of this study, the model of the study investigates the 
relationship between board demographic and cognitive diversity and other control variables (board 
of directors’ size, board independent and board meeting and firm size) with audit quality. This study’s 
hypotheses outlines are examined using the following model: 
 
AUDit = β0 + β1FEMD it + β2DIRAit + β3INTDit+ β4DIRLit+ β5BOASit+β6BOAIit+ βC7BOAMit+ β8 FIRS it+ ε it. 
 
where, for each firm (i) and each year (t) 
AUD it = Audit quality. A dichotomous variable used to examine the hypotheses variables.  
FEMD = Board female director 
DIRA = Directors age (AG1, AG2, AG3, AG4 and AG5) 
INTD = Interlocking directorship 
DIRL = Directors level of education 
BOAS = Board size 
BOAI = Board Independency 
BOAM = Board of directors meeting 
FIRS = Firm size 
ε it = Error term supposed to be normally scattered with constant differences. 
 
5. Results and discussions 
 
Table 1 displays descriptive statistic about audit quality. Audit quality code is a categorical 
variable (3, if the firm used one of the Big4 auditing firms; 2, if a smaller international audit firm; 1, if 
it used a local auditor). While table 2 shows the number of observation, mean, standard deviation, 
min and max for of female directors, directors’ age, and interlocking directorship, level of education 
and control variables (board size, board independent, board size and firm size). Female director is 
measured by number of female directors working in the board of director. Age is classified into 5 
categories, where 1 =25-35, 2 = 36-45, 3 = 46-55, 4= 56-65, and 5 = greater than 65 years. Interlocking 
directorship is measured as a proportion of interlocking directors to total number of directors. 
This study following [4] classifies level of education to four educational levels, based on total 
number of years of formal education in Turkey after high-school: elementary, high school, college 
and graduate school graduates and board of directors with Ph.Ds. Board size represents number of 
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directors working in the corporate board. Board independent is measured by proportion of 
independent directors to total number of board of directors. Number of board meetings (categorized 
as low, medium, and high levels of monitoring effort: 1 = 2-12 meetings, 2 = 13-30 meetings, 3 >30 
meeting). Logn (Total Assets) is firm size.  
Table 3 displays the correlation between this study variable. The general overview indicates that 
the correlation between variable is less than 0.80 (the threshold value). This infers that the 
multicollinearity between variables is at low level. The correlation between FDIRECT and old directors 
is found to be positively correlated with audit quality. While younger director negatively correlated 
with audit quality in term of brand name auditor. Table 3 also, shows that directors occupy more 
than one sit within business group are more likely to engage with high audit quality and this indicates 
that there is a positive relationship between interlocking directorship and audit quality. 
This aligns with the suggestions provided by previous studies such as [29,37] that director who 
work in more than one sit is less likely to spend enough time in organisation. Thus, in order to protect 
their reputational capital, they are more likely to hire high audit quality. Furthermore, the Table 3 
indicates that there are positive relationships between directors hold master certificate and audit 
quality and directors hold high school certificate negatively correlated with high audit quality. This 
study result is in the same line of [5] that directors with high education level are more likely to protect 
their reputational. Thus they are more likely to hire high quality audit. The following subsection 
shows the multiple regression results. 
 
Table l 
Descriptive Statistics (percentage) for Dummy Variables 
Dichotomous Variables Big-4 Frequency Percentage Cumulative 
1 58 13.98 13.98 
2 187 45.06 59.04 
3 170 40.96 100.00 
Totals 411 100.00  
 
This study investigates empirically, the effects of demographic and cognitive diversity on clients’ 
incentive and abilities to demand high audit quality of firms listed in the BI. This section shows the 
descriptive statistic, correlation matrix and multiple regressions of independent variables and 
dependent variable. Table 1 displays that 13.98% of firms sampled are audited by the local auditor 
and they numbered about 58 of observations and the rest about 45.06% and 40.96% of firms 
observed are audited by international audit firms and Big4 audit firms respectively. Table 2 shows 
the mean for the explanatory variables, the values of standard deviation (SD) and their maximum and 
minimum values.  
The statistics in the Table 2 display that the minimum and maximum value of female directors are 
0 and 3 respectively. On the other side, the minimum proportion of directors to total number of 
board of directors’ is 0 for all categories AG1, AG2, AG3, AG4 and AG5 and the maximum is .6666, 1, 
1.2, 0.875 and 0.7777 respectively. The minimum and maximum values of interlocking directorship 
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Descriptive Statistics of Continuous Variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
FEMLD 413 .8184019    .7965035           0 3 
AG1 413 .080355     .1332692           0 .6666667 
AG2 413 .1756933 .1799815           0 1 
AG3 413 .3477556    .2165027           0 1.2 
AG4 413 .2794994    .1945909           0 .875 
AG5 413 .1222271      .14419           0 .7777778 
INTERD 413 3.767157    2.633595           0 12 
HIGHSG 413 .2033898    .5188562           0 3 
UNDERG 413 4.663438    1.764137           0 9 
MASTER 413 1.479419    1.488691           0 7 
PhD 413 .5447942    .8041478           0 4 
BOAS 413 6.881356    2.182892           3 15 
BOAI 413 .2628394    .1395546           0          .5 
BOAM 413 2.024213    .5947951           1 3 
LnTASS 413 8.220792    .8825718    4.898588    10.22392 
 
The minimum proportion of directors to total number of board of directors’ is 0 for all categories 
that are high school graduate, undergraduate, Master and PhD degrees and the maximum value are 
3, 9, 7 and 4 respectively. Standard deviation or degree of dispersion of variables is another part of 
descriptive statistic. The standard deviation of interlocking directorship is 2.6335 and that of board 
size is 2.1828. In general, the level of divergence from the mean is not high in interlocking directorship 
and board size. This infers that the distribution of the data of variables is close clustering around the 
mean indicating its reliability. The next subsection shows the correlation matrix findings displayed on 
Table 3. 
Panel data regression models such as pool OLS, random effect and fixed effect model have been 
used in this study to examine the relationship between dependent variable (audit quality) and 
independent variables (female directors, directors’ age, interlocking directorship, level of education). 
An appropriate estimation of the results and variance in the determination coefficient (R-Squared), 
signs, and their insignificant level shows in the following table. The first estimation was for OLS and 
the result of the estimation failed to meet the standard assumption. Thus, the estimation of fixed 
effect model and random effect model was carried out using Hausman test to select between fixed 
and random models.  The results of Hausman test propose to report the results of random effect 
model and reject fixed effect model. In addition, Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test by Breush and Pagan 
carried to confirm the fitness of random effect model (to select between pool OLS and Random effect 
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Correlation Matrix Results 
 Big4 FEMD AG1 AG2 AG3 AG4 AG5 INTERD HIGHGS UNDERG MASTER PhD BOAS BOAI BOAM lnTASS 
Big4 1.0000                
FEMD 0.1249    1.0000               
AG1 -0.1698 0.1794 1.0000              
AG2 0.0793   -0.0770   -0.1280    1.0000             
AG3 -0.0417   -0.1530   -0.3181   -0.1969    1.0000            
AG4 -0.0028 0.0786   -0.1393   -0.4395   -0.3482    1.0000           
AG5 0.1610    0.0432   -0.1610   -0.1979   -0.3554   -0.0668    1.0000             
INTERD 0.2400    0.2402   -0.0396   -0.0301   -0.0782    0.0772    0.1331   1.0000         
HIGHGS -0.2866   -0.1378    0.0766    0.0296    0.0119   -0.0870    0.0145 -0.2231 1.0000        
UNDERG -0.2791   -0.1259    0.0662    0.1634    0.0780   -0.0642   -0.1708 -0.0511 0.0011    1.0000       
MASTER 0.4202    0.1389   -0.0613   -0.0790   -0.0104    0.0481 0.0915   0.2485 -0.3516   -0.7525    1.0000      
PhD 0.1044    0.1579   -0.0776   -0.2424   -0.0613    0.1722    0.1853 -0.0225 -0.1209   -0.5070    0.0812    1.0000         
BOAS 0.4114    0.0775   -0.2793   -0.1501   -0.0031    0.1244    0.2319   0.1612 -0.1997   -0.2399    0.2738    0.1715    1.0000      ` 
BOAI -0.1401   -0.0670   -0.0636    0.1158   -0.0266   -0.0225   -0.0304 -0.1642 0.0333   0.0610    0.0045    0.0727   -0.0964    1.0000     
BOAM -0.1832    0.0655   -0.0163   -0.0824    0.0728    0.1180   -0.0500   0.1096 0.1263    0.0200    0.0440   -0.0351   -0.1433    0.0562    1.0000  
LnTASS 0.4286   -.0293   -0.2964   -0.1367   -0.0528    0.1736    0.2791   0.2226 -0.2348   -0.2063    0.2945    0.1827    0.5452   -0.0147   -0.0830   1.0000 
 
Table 4 
Regression Results (Note: *** significant at 1% level of significance) 
Variable Coeff. T-Value Probability 
FEMD -.3425335 -1.32 0.188 
AG1 .1984463 0.58 0.563 
AG2 .6895845 2.27*** 0.023 
AG3 .6134976 .2789055*** 0.028 
AG4 .2860773 1.5 0.116 
AG5 .379045 1.19    0.236 
INTERD .2871491 2.42*** 0.015 
HIGHSG -.0814201 -0.14 0.885 
UNDERG .424396 1.16 0.246 
MASTER .8272904 2.20*** 0.028 
PhD .2381093 0.53 0.599 
BOAS .0182181 1.01 0.311 
BOAI -.1341479 -0.98 0.328 
BOAM -.009565 -2.13*** 0.033 
LnTASS .0538185 2.45 0.014 
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The reported R2 using random effect model is 0.27. This indicates that independent variables 
explain about 27% of the deviation in the dependent variable. The suggestion is that, about 25% of 
the deviation in the audit quality is explained by (female director, directors’ age, interlocking 
directorship and level of education) and about 75% of the deviation is explained by variable not 
controlled in the model of this study. The random effects results indicate there is no relationship 
between female directors and audit quality. This indicates that female possess inability to impact in 
the board room in term of auditor selection.  The result support study of [32] that increase in the 
number of female directors lead to increase earning management. This indicates that female director 
in Turkish family firms are not participating in the process of the selection of external auditor and our 
alternative hypothesis (H1b) is rejected. 
The influence of different age categories on the explained variable varied. There is no significant 
effect of young directors between 24-35 years old on clients’ demand for high audit quality. There is 
a positive influence found between directors 36-45 and 46-55 and the clients demand for high audit 
quality. There is no relationship between directors between 56-65 and greater than 65 and clients 
demand for high audit quality. This indicates that our alternative hypothesis (H1b) that expects a 
positive relationship between directors age and audit quality is rejected. This result is contradicted 
to the proposition of resource dependency theory that older directors are more conservative and 
risk-averse. The result is tandem with [30] finding that directors age negatively influences board 
effectiveness in terms of directors’ attendance of board meeting. The logistic regression results 
indicate that interlocking directorship positively influence on audit quality and significant at 5% level. 
This also aligns with the results of [17,34] that interlocking firms are more likely to hire high audit 
quality. This is as a consequence of directors’ tendency to protect their reputation by engagement 
with quality auditors.  However, the result is in contrast with [15,22,38]. 
There is no significant influence of high graduate, undergraduate and PhD on clients’ ability to 
demand high audit quality. While, directors possess high level of education for instance Master 
degree, are more likely to involve with high audit quality. This study’s result supported by several 
scholars such as [5,35]. Nevertheless, it is contradicted to the finding of [13]. Furthermore, in terms 
of control variables, the influence found between board sizes, independency and audit quality is not 
significant. While, there is negative relationship between board meeting and audit quality and 
positive relationship between firm’s size and audit quality. The result support study of [33,39]. 




The discussion addressed above has revealed that demographic diversity (directors age) and 
cognitive diversity (interlocking directorship and level of education) possess positive influence on 
clients’ ability to demand high audit quality of Turkish listed firms. A part from integrated capability 
of independent variables which impacts on clients’ ability to demand high audit quality, individually 
directors age of 36-45, 46-55, interlocking directorship and Master degree directors can enhance 
clients’ ability to demand high quality audit services. This is because diverse attributes of board of 
directors’ influence not only on directors’ incentive to monitor, but also their abilities to do so. Thus, 
the study infers that demographic and cognitive diversity of board of directors has significant impacts 
on clients’ incentive and ability to demand high audit quality. The research therefore, recommends 
that policy makers enforces listed firms to create their boards with different attitudes of directors. 
The study also recommends further studies that will include more data, inclusion of other attitudes 
of board of directors both before and after the regulatory changes of 2012 for comparison of clients’ 
demand before and the amendments.    
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